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Abstract: Advent of business over Internet have given rise to a number of innovative
trading mechanisms. In this work we propose a new auction mechanism, called as discount
auctions, for procuring heterogeneous items. The buyer, who is the auctioneer, has an
unit demand for M distinct items. The suppliers, who are the bidders, specify individual
costs for each of the items. In addition, a supplier also specifies a discount function: a
non-decreasing function over the number of items. This discount bid, in essence, conveys
the individual costs for each of the items and the discount that can be availed based on
the number of items bought. The winner determination problem faced by the buyer is to
choose the optimal set of winning suppliers and their respective winning items such that
the total cost of procurement is minimized. First we show that this problem is NP-hard
upon reduction from the set covering problem. Next we propose two exact algorithms to
solve the problem to optimality. The first one is a branch-and-bound algorithm, called as
branch-on-supply (BoS), which does not use mathematical programming formulation but
rather exploits the embedded network structure. The second is a suite of branch-and-cut
algorithms. We derive valid inequalities to the integer programming formulation, which serve
as cuts for the LP relaxation. A heuristic branching technique, called as branch-on-price
(BoP), is proposed that branches on the current price of an item, which is partially supplied
by more than one supplier. The design philosophies of the above are different in the sense
that BoS searches for the optimal number of items from the suppliers, whereas BoP searches
for the optimal price of the items. We compare the performance of these algorithms with
extensive computational experiments.
Key-words: e-procurement, auctions, integer programming, transportation problem,
branch-and-bound, linear programming relaxation, duality, valid inequalities
Enchère de type pondéré pour l’acquisition d’articles
multiples
Résumé : L’arrivée de l’Internet dans le monde des affaires a provoqué la naissance
d’un certain nombre de mécanismes de ventes (relations client-fournisseur) innovants. Dans
cette étude, nous proposons un nouveau mécanisme d’enchère appelé discount auctions pour
l’acquisition d’articles multiples (de types et de tailles différents). Un acheteur (client dans
notre cas) exprime une demande unitaire pour M différents articles. Un ensemble de ven-
deurs (fournisseurs dans notre cas) vont cherché à répondre à ces demandes. L’offre d’un
vendeur est composée du prix de chacun des articles séparément et d’une fonction de pondé-
ration qui indique la remise offerte sur la base du nombre d’articles achetés (plus d’articles
achetés et plus la remise sur le prix de vente est importante). Le problème rencontré par
l’acheteur est d’identifier, parmi l’ensemble des tous les vendeurs, les vendeurs dits vain-
queurs ainsi que les articles achetés chez chacun d’eux en minimisant le coût d’achat total.
Dans un premier temps, nous avons prouvé que ce problème d’optimisation est NP-difficile
en utilisant une réduction du problème dit de recouvrement. Nous avons développé deux
algorithmes exacts de types banch-and-bound. Le premier, appelé branch-on-supply (BoS),
n’utilise pas la formulation mathématique du problème mais exploite sa structure de type
réseau. Le second est un ensemble d’algorithmes de types branch-and-cut. En effet, nous
avons introduit des inégalités dites valides dans le programme linéaire en nombres entiers
modélisant le problème pour servir comme des coupes pour la relaxation de type LP. Une
heuristique de branchement, appelée branch-on-price (BoP), est proposée. Les philosophies
de conception des deux algorithmes sont différentes. BoS cherche à déterminer le nombre
optimal d’articles à acheter de chaque fournisseur. A l’inverse, BoP cherche à déterminer le
prix optimal de chaque article. Pour comparer les performances de deux algorithmes, des
expériences numériques ont été réalisées et analysées.
Mots-clés : e-procurement, enchères, programmation en nombres entiers, problème de
transport, méthode de séparation et évaluation, relaxation, dualité, inégalités valides
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1 Introduction
Procurement is the process by which a company obtains materials and services necessary
for its manufacturing and/or operations. Traditionally, the procurement process begins
with the buyer sending a request for quotation (RFQ) to the potential suppliers. The RFQ
contains details about the demands of the buyer and the suppliers respond with bids. The
buyer evaluates the bids and chooses the suppliers, based on the purchasing policies. The
dynamics of procurement process, involving suppliers responding with bids and the buyer
evaluating the bids, borders on the auction mechanism. Auction is a market mechanism with
well-defined set of rules for determining the terms of an exchange of something for money [24].
In auction parlance, buyer is the auctioneer and the suppliers are bidders in procurement.
The auction mechanism is more structured than the procurement process. However, it forms
the core of the many procurement scenarios. For example, consider a government tender
for procuring a service like construction of a bridge. The constructors are the suppliers and
they respond with sealed bids, quoting the cost of construction, among the other required
things. Assuming that the cost is the only negotiable criterion, the constructor with the
least quoted cost is chosen as the winner and he is supposed to provide the service at the
quoted cost. This is the well known first price sealed bid auction, where the lowest bidder is
awarded the contract for the quoted price.
The advent of Internet and Internet-based technologies have led to new and innovative
auction mechanisms for procurement. Initially, in the past few years, naive use of Internet
and information technologies saw complex back-end applications supporting supply chains of
large companies, with simple front-end e-catalog systems supporting procurement. Recent
trends are focusing on user friendly Business-to-Business e-procurement applications that
embed sophisticated business logic and algorithms. With the Internet technologies enabling
an interactive front end for human interaction and back end computers that can support
complex computations, the research in e-procurement is focused on auction mechanisms,
bidding languages, and bid evaluation techniques to make the process computationally and
economically efficient. This has led to new generation of procurement techniques: volume-
discount [9, 12], combinatorial [10, 14], and multi-attribute [2, 1, 20]. For a more general
review of auction techniques in e-commerce and e-procurement, see [11, 4].
The auction mechanism used for e-procurement primarily depends on the type and num-
ber of items procured. In the above tender example, the demand was for a single indivisible
item and the first price sealed bid auction was used. For an industrial procurement of large
quantity of a single good (like raw material), volume discount auctions [12, 22, 21] are ap-
propriate candidates. The bid submitted by a supplier is a cost function defined over the
quantity. The function, in essence, can capture the discount offered by the supplier based
on the quantity procured. Combinatorial auctions (CA) [8], are useful for procuring a set of
heterogeneous, but related items. CA allows package bidding, that is, quoting a single cost
for a bundle (subset) of items. In this way, the bidders can capture the complementarity
or substitutability existing among the items in a bundle. For M items, a bidder could thus
possibly submit 2M−1 combinatorial bids, one for each of the possible bundles. The volume
discount and combinatorial auctions have led to several profitable industrial procurements
INRIA
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[14, 10, 3]. In this work, we propose a new auction mechanism called as discount auctions
for procuring heterogeneous items.
The proposed discount auctions (DA) is applicable in scenarios where the items do not
exhibit complementarity or substitutability. Consider the procurement of office supplies:
stationary, computers, and furniture. A supplier has positive cost for each of the items and
his profits may not change substantially by selling them separately or together. If he cannot
sell the furniture in this auction, he can sell it elsewhere. This is not the case with items that
exhibit complementarity. Bundles of items that cannot be split and items that cannot be
bundled together are not uncommon in scenarios with complementarity and substitutability,
respectively. Given that such conditions do not exist, the supplier is not concerned about
which bundle of items, but rather about how much worth of items he can sell. The proposed
DA is useful for such scenarios. The supplier has positive cost for each of the items, and in
order to promote sales he gives incentive to the buyer by providing discounts on the number
of items procured. The discount bid consists of two parts: (1) individual cost for each of
the items and (2) discounts for different number of items (for example, if three items are
bought then the discount is 5%, for four items 6%, etc.). The difference between DA and
CA is obvious: the costs in the CA are defined over the subsets of the items whereas the
discounts in the DA are defined over the cardinality of the subsets of the items.
In this work, we focus on the winner determination or bid evaluation problem of DA.
The winner determination problem faced by the buyer is to choose a set of winning bids
and a set of winning items for each of the winning bids, such that all demanded items are
procured at minimal (total) cost. We show that this problem is NP-hard and propose two
branch and bound algorithms to solve the problem to optimality. The preliminary versions
of this work have been presented in [18, 19, 17].
The rest of the report is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the
DA and the winner determination problem is modeled as an integer program. The problem
is shown to be NP-hard, upon reduction from the set covering problem, in Section 3. The
exploitable combinatorial and network structures of the problem are studied in Section 4.
The linear programming relaxation of the problem and its relation to a network structure are
discussed in Section 5. This network structure, in particular, the transportation structure
is exploited in Section 6.1, to develop the branch-and-bound algorithm, called as branch-on-
supply. A tight LP relaxation with valid inequalities is developed in Section 7. A suite of
branch-and-cut algorithms are developed in Section 8, which uses the tight LP relaxation
as the lower bounding technique. Computational experiments are presented in Section 9.
Conclusions and future work are discussed in Section 10.
2 Discount Auctions
2.1 Problem Definition
The buyer is interested in procuring M different items. Each of the item is indivisible, i.e.
it can be supplied by only one supplier. An item need not refer to a single unit. It can
RR n° 6084
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be a computer or a computer and printer or hundred computers, but it cannot be split and
supplied by multiple suppliers. Let there be N suppliers. An item is denoted by index m and
a supplier by index j. Each supplier can submit only one discount bid and hence the index
j is used to denote both the supplier and his bid. The discount bid j (i.e. from supplier j)
consists of two parts: (1) cost Qmj for each item m and (2) non-decreasing discount θ
i
j for i
(= 1, . . . , M) number of items. The bid can be compactly expressed as an ordered pair of
M -tuples: ((Q1j , . . . , Q
m
j , . . . , Q
M
j ), (θ
1
j , . . . , θ
i
j , . . . , θ
M
j )). Note that m denotes a particular
item and i denotes number of items. If the buyer procures items 2, 4, and 7 from bid j, then
the cost of procurement is (1− θ3j )(Q
2
j + Q
4
j + Q
7
j). The i = 3 in θ
3
j , as three items 2, 4, and
7 were procured. Note that this is different from the volume discounts, which are used in
procuring multiple units of the same item. All the Qmj are positive (possibly infinite for an
unavailable item) and the θij are non decreasing over i (the discount cannot decrease with
the number of items bought). One of the main issues in auction design is bid preparation
and communication. In CAs, the number of possible combinatorial bids from a supplier is
2M−1 (one bid for each subset). Thus both the bid preparation and communication (to the
buyer) is costly. In DAs, only one discount bid is submitted from a supplier and its length
is linear (2M) in the number of items.
2.2 Winner Determination Problem
The winner determination problem (WDP) faced by the buyer is to choose a set of winning
bids and a set of winning items for each of the winning bids, such that all demanded items
are procured at total minimal cost. Without the discount function, the problem can be
solved in O(NM) time (choose the minimum bidder for each of the items). Due to the
discount function, the cost of an item bought from a bid depends on the total number of
items bought from that bid. Hence, the formulation should also take into account the total
number of items bought from a bid. If i items are bought from a bid j, then the cost of an
item m is (1 − θij)Q
m
j . With two different decision variables to choose an item m and the
number of items i from bid j, the cost of an item would be a nonlinear function. To linearize
the objective function, we define the effective cost of an item m if i items are bought from
bid j as
pimj = (1− θ
i
j)Q
m
j (1)
The WDP can be restated as choosing the items with minimal sum of effective costs sub-
ject to the demand and discount constraints. Following is an integer programming (IP)
formulation for the bid evaluation problem.
min
∑
j
∑
i
∑
m
pimj w
im
j (2)
subject to
∑
i v
i
j ≤ 1 ∀j (3)
∑
m w
im
j = iv
i
j ∀i, j (4)
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∑
j
∑
i w
im
j = 1 ∀m (5)
wimj , v
i
j ∈ {0, 1} ∀j, i, m (6)
In the remainder of this report, the notation ∀j denotes j = 1, . . . , N . Similarly, ∀i and
∀m denote i = 1, . . . , M and m = 1, . . . , M , respectively. The binary decision variable wimj
is to choose an item m from bid j with effective cost pimj and binary variable v
i
j is to choose
i items from j. A constraints in (3) is a multiple choice constraint for variables vij in i that
determines the number of items i bought from j. If
∑
i v
i
j = 0, then no items are chosen
from j and if vij = 1, i items are bought from j. Constraints (4) ensure that the items chosen
from j are consistent with their effective cost: if i items are chosen, then they have the cost
with discount for i items. Constraints (5) ensure that every item is procured from only one
supplier. Thus the constraint sets (3) and (4) are for supply and constraint set (5) is for the
demand.
3 Complexity of the Winner Determination Problem
Theorem 1 The WDP of the discount auctions is NP-hard.
Proof: We prove the hardness of the WDP by showing that the decision version of the
WDP is NP-complete upon reduction from the minimum set cover.
Definition 1 ([DAuc])
INSTANCE: Set of goods G = {1, . . . , M}, set of discount bids J = {1, . . . , N}, where a
discount bid j ≡ ((Q1j , . . . , Q
M
j ), (θ
1
j , . . . , θ
M
j )) with Q
m
j ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ G and 0 ≤ θ
i
j ≤ θ
i+1
j ≤ 1,
1 ≤ i < M , and a goal K ≥ 0.
QUESTION: Does there exist a winning set J ′ ⊆ J , which defines a partition P = {Bj : Bj ⊆
G, j ∈ J ′} of G, such that the total cost of procurement
∑
j∈J′(1 − θ
|Bj |
j )
∑
m∈Bj
Qmj ≤ K?
Definition 2 ([SCov])
INSTANCE: Collection C of subsets of finite set F , positive weight wR ∀R ∈ C, and a goal
H ≥ 0.
QUESTION: Does there exist a cover C′ ⊆ C for F such that
∑
R∈C′ wR ≤ H?
The minimum set cover [SCov] is NP-complete [13]. First we note that [DAuc] is in
NP : given a winning set J ′ ⊆ J , one can verify whether it defines a partition and the
procurement cost is less than K in polynomial time. Let an instance of [SCov] be given. We
construct an instance of [DAuc] in the following way:
• G = F , |J | = |C|
• Create a bid j for each of the subset R ∈ C as follows:
Qmj =
{
wR if m ∈ R
∞ otherwise
}
, ∀m
θij =
i− 1
i
, 1 ≤ i ≤M
RR n° 6084
8 Kameshwaran S, L. Benyoucef, & X. Xie
• K = H
The above reduction can be clearly done in polynomial time. We now show that the reduction
is valid by showing that an instance of [SCov] is an yes iff if its reduction [DAuc] is an yes
instance.
(⇐) Let there exist an yes instance of [DAuc] with J ′ ⊆ J defining a partition of G with
procurement cost ≤ K. A cover C′ for [SCov] can be constructed as follows. For every
j ∈ J ′, include the corresponding subset R in C′. Note that Bj ⊆ R as m 6∈ R implies
Qmj =∞. The cost of procurement from winning bid j is given by
(1− θ
|Bj |
j )
∑
m∈Bj
Qmj
=
(
1
|Bj |
)
|Bj |wR
= wR
Thus the cost of procurement from each bid is equal to the weight of the corresponding
subset in C′. Since the winning bids partition G, the collection C′ covers F with cost
≤ K = H .
(⇒) Let there exist an yes instance for [SCov] with cover C′. The solution to [DAuc] can
be constructed as follows. For every subset R ∈ C′, include its corresponding bid j in J ′.
Since C′ covers F , J ′ also covers G. If an item is supplied by more than one supplier then it
can be removed from its respective suppliers except one. Note that removing an item from
bid will not change the cost because of the assumed discount and cost structure. Hence, we
have a partition of G that satisfies the goal.
Proposition 1 Following special cases are solvable in polynomial time:
1. Same Cost: Qmj = Q
≥
j 0, ∀j, m
2. Same Discount: θij = θ
∗
j , ∀j, i
3. |M | ≤ 2
(1) This special case is a multi-unit auction of a single good. The requirement of the
buyer is M units of a single good and the suppliers submit a bid with unit cost Q∗j and
a discount function. The WDP can be formulated as the following integer programming
problem:
(P) : min
∑
j
∑
i
(1− θij)iQ
∗
jv
i
j (7)
subject to
∑
i
vij ≤ 1, ∀j (8)
INRIA
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∑
j
∑
i
ivij = M (9)
vij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j, i (10)
The above formulation is a multiple choice knapsack problem [28] with (8) as the multiple
choice constraints and (9) as the knapsack constraint. Though the generic multiple choice
knapsack problem is NP-hard, the above problem is solvable in linear time due to its cost
structure. We show this using the duality theory. Let βj be the dual variable for the multiple
choice constraint for j in (8) and π be the dual variable for the knapsack constraint (9). The
linear programming dual of the above problem is:
(D) : max πM +
∑
j
βj (11)
subject to
iπ + βj ≤ (1− θ
i
j)iQ
∗
j , ∀j, i (12)
βj ≥ 0, ∀j (13)
Let j′ = argminj{(1 − θMj )MQ
∗
j}. Assign βj′ = (1 − θ
M
j′ )MQ
∗
j′ and βj = 0, ∀j 6= j
′ and
π = 0. This is a feasible dual solution with objective value βj′ . A feasible solution to
the primal problem can be constructed from this dual solution. Assign V Mj′ = 1, V
i
j′ = 0,
∀i 6= M , and V ij = 0, ∀j 6= j
′ and ∀i. This is a feasible primal solution with the same
objective value as of the dual and hence by duality theory it is an optimal solution to the
linear relaxation. This optimal solution to the linear relaxation is integral and hence it is
also optimal to the original integer programming problem. Thus the optimal solution to this
WDP is minj(1 − θMj )MQ
∗
j , which can be solved in linear time.
(2) If the discounts are the same for each bidder, then it is equivalent to no discount, which
can be solved in polynomial time (O(MN)) by choosing the bidder with minimum cost for
each item.
(3) If M = 1, then WDP can be solved in linear time by choosing the bid with minimum
cost. For M = 2, there are only two possibilities: buy at most one item from each buyer
and buy both the items from a single buyer. The first problem is an assignment problem
and the second is choosing the minimum cost for both items from N bidders. The optimal
solution is the one with the minimum cost among the above two solutions.
4 Exploitable Structures
Knowledge of a structure in a problem can be exploited in designing the solution techniques
and algorithms for solving the problem. The WDP is explored in this section for such
structures in terms of both problem definition and formulation.
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(Bids) (Items)
1
m
M
1
j
N
(1)
(1)
(1)
(M)
(M)
(M)
Supply Nodes Demand Nodes
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
c(j,m)
Figure 1: Embedded network structure
4.1 Combinatorial Structure
In CA, the bidder provides a single price for a subset of items, and he can submit different
bids for different subsets. The bids submitted in DA can be easily converted into combi-
natorial bids. A combinatorial bid for bundle (subset) B from supplier j has a single price
P (B, j). From a discount bid j, the cost of a combinatorial bid for each bundle B can be
easily obtained as follows:
P (B, j) = (1− θ
|B|
j )
∑
m∈B
Qmj (14)
Thus given the discount bids, one can construct combinatorial bids. The solution of the bid
evaluation problem for the combinatorial bids is also the solution to that of the discount
auction. The restriction of choosing at most one bundle from each supplier need not be
imposed, as there will always exist an optimal solution with at most one bundle from a
supplier due to the non-decreasing discount function. The winner determination algorithms
for CAs are well studied [29, 23] and hence one can use them for solving the discount auctions.
However, the DA is only an instance of the CA, and hence it is possible to develop more
efficient solution techniques by exploiting the other possible structures.
4.2 Network Structure
The WDP of DA can be considered as a transportation network with N supply nodes (bids)
and M demand nodes (one for each item). Each supply node has a supply of M units and
INRIA
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each demand node has a unit demand. The embedded transport structure is shown in Figure
1. A flow in the network connecting node j to node m indicate that bid j is supplying item
m. Due to the unit demand at each demand node, the flow in any given arc will be at most
one. The complicating feature of the model is the cost c(j, m) of the flow in the arc (j, m),
which is the function of number of units supplied from node j. Note that this is different
from the conventional nonlinear cost network models, where the cost will vary based on the
flow through the arc, whereas in this case the cost varies on the total flow from the supply
node. Let δj be the total supply from node j in a solution. Then the cost of the flow in an
arc (j, m) is given by c(j, m) = (1− θ
sj
j )Q
m
j . The solution is feasible only if the total supply
∑
j δj = M . It is worth noting that for a given feasible supply, determining the optimal flow
is a transportation problem. Thus the problem can be solved without the integer restrictions
on the flow. In terms of the IP formulation presented in Section 2, if the binary variable
{vij} are fixed in a feasible way, {w
im
j } can be easily obtained by solving a transportation
problem. Once the {vij} are fixed, the discounts are known and hence the problem is easy.
The binary variables {wimj } can indeed be relaxed to take continuous values, as there will
always exist an optimal solution with integer values.
5 Linear Programming Relaxation
In this section we study the linear programming (LP) relaxation of the IP formulation
presented in Section 2. The LP relaxation provides the lower bound on optimal cost, which
is useful in pruning the search space in branch-and-bound algorithms. Moreover, for this
problem, the LP relaxation is equivalent to solving a transportation problem. We study the
LP relaxation by investigating its dual.
Let {γj}, {λij}, and {γ
m} be the dual variables corresponding to the constraints (3), (4),
and (5), respectively. The dual of the linear relaxation is given by:
max
∑
m
γm −
∑
j
γj (15)
subject to
γm + λij ≤ p
im
j ∀j, i, m (16)
−γj − iλij ≤ 0 ∀i, j (17)
γj ≥ 0 ∀j (18)
A feasible solution to the above problem can be easily obtained. The nonnegative vari-
ables γj have negative coefficients in the objective function and hence can be equated to zero.
The variables λij are common to both the constraints and can be eliminated by equating
to zero. Thus γm = minj,i{pimj }. The θ
i
j are non-decreasing over i by assumption. Hence
the pimj are non-increasing and therefore γ
m = minj{pMmj }. From this dual solution one
can easily construct a feasible solution to the linear relaxation and these both are optimal
solutions to their respective problems.
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Proposition 2 {πj = 0, λij = 0, γ
m = minj{pMmj }} is the optimal dual solution and v
i
j = 0
for i < M , vMj =
∑
m
wMmj
M
, where
wMmj′ =
{
1 if j′ = argminj{pMmj }
0 otherwise
}
(19)
is the optimal solution to the linear relaxation.
It can be easily seen that the solutions are feasible to their respective problems. Moreover,
they both have the same objective value. Hence by strong duality theorem, they are optimal
solutions. The LP relaxation considers only the maximum discounted cost (with discount
for M items) and allocates the items based on this minimum cost. As a consequence, it
violates the discount constraint by procuring less number of items from a supplier but with
a maximum discount for M items. It is worth noting that only variables {vij} take continuous
values.
The linear relaxation problem can be solved in O(MN) by taking the minimum of pMmj
over j, for each m. If the {vMj } are fractional, then it is not an optimal solution to the
WDP. One can easily construct a feasible integer solution ({vmj }, {w
im
j }) to the WDP from
the fractional ({vMj }, {w
Mm
j }).
1. δj =
∑
m w
Mm
j , ∀j; v
m
j = v
m
j , ∀j, m; w
im
j = w
im
j , ∀j, i, m;
2. ∀j do:
(a) if (vMj > 0) v
sj
j ← 1, v
M
j ← 0;
(b) ∀m if (wMmj = 1) w
δj ,m
j ← 1, w
Mm
j ← 0;
6 Branch-and-Bound Algorithm
B&B is an exact intelligent enumerative technique that attempts to avoid enumerating a
large portion of the feasible integer solutions [5, 27]. It is a widely used approach for solving
discrete optimization, combinatorial optimization, and integer programming problems in
general. The B&B approach first partitions the overall set of feasible solutions into two
or more sets and as the algorithm proceeds the set is partitioned into many simpler and
smaller sets, which are explored for the optimal solution. Each such set is represented by a
candidate problem (CP). A typical iteration of B&B consists of:
• Selection/Removal of a CP from the list of CPs
• Determining the lower bound of the selected CP
• Fathoming or pruning, if possible, the selected CP
• Determining and updating the incumbent solution, if possible
INRIA
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• Branching strategy: If the CP is not fathomed, branching creates subproblems
which are added to the list of CPs
The algorithm first starts with a single CP in the list representing the entire feasible set of
solutions. As the algorithm proceeds, numerous CPs are added to the list, each containing
a set of feasible solutions. The CPs partition the search space and at every iteration, a
prospective CP is chosen to search for the optimal solution. The CP though containing less
number of solutions than the original problem, could still be hard to solve, and hence a easily
solvable lower bounding technique is applied to obtain a good lower bound on the objective
value. This lower bound is for the solutions in that particular CP. If a feasible solution had
been obtained so far in the algorithm, it can be used to prune a CP with lower bound greater
than the cost of the known solution. A CP can be fathomed (removed from further search)
if the best solution in that CP is found. If not fathomed, it is then split into smaller CPs
and added to the list of CPs. As the algorithm proceeds, the best known feasible solution
is maintained and when the list of CPs become empty, the best known feasible solution is
the optimal solution.
Although the B&B technique is easy to understand, the implementation for a particular
problem is a nontrivial task [5] requiring:
• An efficient lower bounding technique that can be solved with less computational
efforts and also guarantee a tight lower bound
• Efficient data structures for handling the rather complicated book-keeping of the list
of CPs,
• Clever strategies for selecting promising CPs, and
• Branching strategies that could effectively prune the enumeration tree.
The conventional techniques for implementing the above are to use the LP relaxation
as the lower bounding technique with variable dichotomy as the branching technique. If
the LP relaxation provides a solution with non-integer values for integer variables, then one
such variable is chosen and CPs are created by imposing bounds on the variable. The CPs
are searched using the best first search (BFS). These techniques are generic and are used
by many commercial solvers. In this work, we develop two B&B techniques that exploit
the structure of the DA. They differ in the lower bounding techniques and the branching
strategies. Both algorithms guarantee a feasible solution at every iteration, using heuristic
techniques. The BFS is used as the search technique. The higher level algorithm, without
the implementation details of the specific strategies is presented next.
1. (Initialize)
cp ← {WDP}; pq = ∅; ls = ∅; is = ∅; bs = ∅;
2. ls← LowerBound(cp); is← Heuristic(ls); bs← is;
3. if Z(ls) = Z(is) end;
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4. pq.insert(cp);
5. while pq 6= ∅ do:
(a) cp← pq.DeleteMin();
(b) if Z(LowerBound(cp)) ≥ Z(bs) end;
(c) Create(cp−);
(d) ls← LowerBound(cp−); is← Heuristic(ls);
(e) if Z(is) < Z(bs) bs← is;
(f) if Z(ls) < Z(bs) pq.insert(cp−);
(g) Create(cp+);
(h) ls← LowerBound(cp+); is← Heuristic(ls);
(i) if Z(is) < Z(bs) bs← is;
(j) if Z(ls) < Z(bs) pq.insert(cp+);
The list of CPs is stored in a priority queue pq. The deletemin operation of the
priority queue returns the CP with the least lower bound. If the selected CP is not
pruned, two child CPs are generated and added to the priority queue if they are not in-
feasible/fathomed/pruned. The priority queue is implemented using the binary heap data
structure. Every insertion and deletion is of complexity O(log P ), where P is the current
size of the queue [7]. The routine LowerBound determines the lower bound and returns the
lower bound solution (possibly infeasible to the WDP). The Heuristic constructs a feasible
incumbent solution to the WDP from the lower bound solution. Using the branching tech-
nique two candidate problems cp− and cp+ are created from cp using the routine Create,
partitioning the solution space of cp. The implementation details of these routines for the
proposed algorithms will be presented later. The is, bs, and ls store the incumbent solution,
the best incumbent solution, and the lower bound solution, respectively. The Z(· ) denotes
the optimal objective value of the solution (· ). At the end of the algorithm, bs contains the
optimal solution to the WDP.
6.1 Branch-on-Supply
The B&B algorithm developed in this work, called as branch-on-supply (BoS) does not use
the IP formulation of the WDP, but rather uses the network structure. Note that if the
optimal number of winning items for each of the bid is known, then finding the respective
winning items is an easy problem. The BoS uses this principle to search for optimal number
of winning items.
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CP-: [Sj , δj] CP+: [δj + 1, Sj ]
Figure 2: Branching Strategy of BoS
6.2 Candidate Problem and the Lower Bounding Technique
The CP represents the set of feasible solutions it contains. BoS uses the following CP:
each bid j has a supply in range [Sj , Sj ]. Thus the first CP, which contains all the feasible
solutions has Sj = 0 and Sj = M , ∀j. The CP is feasible iff Sj ≤ Sj , ∀j and
∑
j Sj ≤M ≤
∑
j S. The lower bound to the CP is obtained by solving it as an interval transportation
problem with supply for j bounded in the interval [Sj , Sj ] and with cost on the link (j, m)
as p
Sjm
j . Clearly the optimal objective value of the interval transportation problem is the
lower bound to the associated CP, as the considered cost is the maximum discounted cost.
6.3 Branching Strategy
If a CP is not fathomed or pruned or infeasible, then it is partitioned into two subproblems
CP- and CP+. Let δj be the number of items supplied by bid j in the lower bound solution.
Obviously δj ∈ [Sj , Sj ]. If δj = Sj , ∀j then the lower bound solution is the optimal solution
of that CP and the CP said to be fathomed. If δj < Sj for at least one bid j, then the
bid supplies δj items for a discount of Sj items, violating the discount constraint. Two
subproblems CP- and CP+ are created by branching on a discount violating bid as shown
in Figure 2. The upper bound on the supply of CP- is changed to δj and the lower bound
of CP+ is changed to δj + 1. The supply range of the other bids are not changed. Note
that, the solution space of the CP is partitioned into two and the lower bound solution of
CP is not feasible to the interval transportation problems of CP- and CP+. Thus, when
these problems are solved, the same lower bound solution is not encountered. If there are
several such discount violating bids, one of them is chosen to create two subproblems. The
branching bid as follows:
j′ = argmin
j
{(Sj − δj) : δj < Sj} (20)
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6.4 Primal Heuristics to Determine Incumbent Solutions
The lower bound solution with supplies {δj} and the flow is a feasible solution to the WDP
as
∑
j δj = M . However, the cost of the solution is not compatible, as it determined using
{p
Sjm
j }, instead of {p
δjm
j }. Therefore, the allocation of winning items may not be optimal
to the supplies {δj}. To get the optimal allocation, a transportation network is constructed
with supplies {δj} and flow costs {{p
δjm
j }. The flow to this new network is a feasible solution
to the WDP. Thus BoS is an anytime algorithm that can be terminated anytime guaranteeing
a feasible solution.
6.5 BoS vs LP Relaxation based B&B
At the outset, the design philosophy of BoS looks very different from that of conventional LP
relaxation based B&B. However, a deep investigation shows that both share many similarities
with respect to the lower bounding technique and the branching strategy. As mentioned in
Section 5, the LP relaxation is the transportation problem with flow cost equal to the
maximum discounted cost. This is the same with the interval transportation problem,
which uses the maximum discounted cost (p
Sjm
j ) for item m from j. However, there is a
lower bound Sj on the number of items that can be supplied from j. Thus, the problem is
more constrained than the LP relaxation and one can expect a more tightened lower bound.
In the LP relaxation of the WDP, only the integrality of the binary variables {vij} are
violated. If variable dichotomy branching is used, then a fractional vij is chosen and two
subproblems are created by imposing vij = 0 in of them and v
i
j = 1 in the other. The
constraints (3) involving {vij} are specially ordered set of type1 (SOS1) constraints. SOS1
constraints impose at most one variable in the constraint to be positive. The effective
branching strategy for SOS1 is to choose an index i′ and create two CPs by imposing
∑
i≤i′ v
i
j ≤ 1 in of them and
∑
i>i′ v
i
j ≤ 1 in the other. This essentially means that in the
first CP, bid j can supply at most i′ items and in the second CP, it can possibly supply
more than i′. This is similar to the branching used in BoS. However, in BoS the respective
constraints are of form
∑
i≤i′ v
i
j = 1 and
∑
i>i′ v
i
j = 1.
7 Valid Inequalities as Cuts
A valid inequality for an IP problem is an inequality that is satisfied by all the feasible
solutions. Valid inequalities that are not part of a formulation are essentially redundant
constraints. However, they may serve as cuts if they are not satisfied by all feasible solutions
of the LP relaxation [31]. A cut that is not satisfied by an optimal solution of the LP
relaxation is called as a violated cut. Addition of a violated cut to the LP relaxation tightens
it and provides a better bound. In this way, the formulation is changed in such a way that
the LP feasible region becomes smaller but the IP feasible region is unaffected. Identification
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of violated cuts, adding them to the LP relaxation, and resolving them to find better bounds,
can be iterated till no violated cuts can be found.
The optimal LP solution to the IP formulation (Section 2.2) had binary values for {wimj }
and fractional values for {vij}. Hence the following valid inequalities serve as cuts to the LP
relaxation:
wimj ≤ v
i
j ∀j, i, m (21)
They are obviously valid for the IP formulation and they exclude the optimal solution
of the original LP relaxation. Hence, the bounds obtained can be expected to be tighter
than the original formulation. The above family of cuts were generated by studying the
LP relaxation solution. This does not involve solving separation problems and hence no
algorithmic efforts involved. Further the size of the family of cuts is polynomial: O(NM2).
However, these cuts are not facet defining and hence not strong enough to remove all the
infeasible linear solutions.
The optimal solution of the LP relaxation with cuts satisfies the following properties:
1. If vij > 0, then number of non-zero w
im
j s are greater than or equal to i.
2. The {wimj } take binary values only if {v
i
j} are binary.
The first property is a direct consequence of the valid inequalities and the constraint set (4).
The second property follows from the first.
8 Branch-and-Cut Algorithms
Branch-and-cut [25] is a generalization of B&B, which includes the cut routine to identify
and add violated cuts. The generation of tighter bounds with addition of violated cuts
helps in pruning the B&B nodes, thereby reducing the search space. At each node, the
LP relaxation is repeatedly solved with addition of new cuts each time. There are several
variations of B&C with respect to cuts generation and addition. For a detailed exposure, see
[6, 26]. Cuts can be added to the B&B tree in various ways, leading to different algorithms.
Cut-and-branch (C&B) is a B&C variant where a family of cuts are added to the formu-
lation and B&B is applied to the modified formulation. This technique is useful if generation
of cuts are easier and are known a priori (as is the case in our problem). It is advantageous
as the cuts added are valid throughout the tree and no further cuts are required to be added.
Usually the number of cuts added are very large and many of them may not be useful. With
large number of constraints, the time taken to solve the LP relaxation can increase consid-
erably. An alternate approach is to add the cuts that are only violated by the current LP
solution. In this way, cuts are progressively added. There are two possible approaches here:
B&C-global, in which cuts added are valid throughout the search tree and B&C-local, where
the cuts added are valid only to the subtree of the current node.
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8.1 Branch-on-Price
In this section, we propose a new heuristic branching technique called as branch-on-price
(BoP). According to the properties of the optimal LP solution mentioned in Section 7, either
all variables are binary (in which case optimal to the IP) or many variables are fractional.
The variable dichotomy branching is to chose a particular fractional vij or w
im
j to create two
CPs by imposing the variable to equal to 0 and 1, respectively. The branching on a vij is
more generic than that on a wimj . The former splits the solution space based on the number
of items supplied by a bid, whereas the latter is more specific about an item, supplied by
a particular bid that supplies a certain number of other items. We propose here a novel
technique to create candidate problems by branching on the price of an item.
Most of the integer variables in an IP formulation of combinatorial or discrete opti-
mization problems are auxiliary variables created to impose logical constraints or linear
constraints. Hence branching on such variables directly may not have logical or natural
implication on the way the subsequent candidate problems are created. Further, the size
of the solution set of these candidate problems may not be balanced, thus resulting in a
unbalanced search tree. For example, a candidate problem created by fixing wimj = 1 may
have very less number of solutions compared with the CP created by fixing wimj = 0. Instead
of creating CPs by branching on fractional variables, we create by branching on the price of
an item, which is fractionally supplied by more than one supplier.
Let wimj be fractional. Due to the constraint (5), there exist at least one another w
i′m
j′
with i 6= i′, which is fractional. Let βm be the price of the item m as dictated by the LP
solution:
βm =
∑
j
∑
i
pimj w
im
j (22)
We create two CPs, CP- and CP+, by branching on the above price. The CP- is created by
adding the following constraints:
wimj = 0 if p
im
j ≥ β
m, ∀j, i, m (23)
The CP+ is created by adding constraints
wimj = 0 if p
im
j < β
m, ∀j, i, m (24)
The two CPs partition the IP feasible solution space. The optimal LP solution (which is
infeasible) does not belong to the solution space of the relaxations of the either of the CPs.
To facilitate this branching, we represent a CP by using bounds on the prices of each of the
items.
The CP is compactly represented by using an allowable price range [βm, β
m
) for each item
m. Algebraically, this is achieved by imposing the following bounds in the IP formulation:
wimj = 0 if p
im
j is outside the above range. The initial CP contains all the solutions and
hence βm = minj{pMmj } and β
m
= maxj{p1mj }+ǫ, for some ǫ < 0. If an item m is chosen for
branching with price βm, then CP- has [βm, βm) and CP+ has [βm, β
m
), as the respective
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m
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CP-: [βm, βm) CP+: [βm, β
m
)
Figure 3: Branching Strategy of BoP
price range for m. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Note that the price range of other items
will remain the same as that of the parent CP.
The above branching scheme imposes many variables to be zero, across several bids,
rather than just fixing one variable to 0 or 1, as in the variable dichotomy branching. Further,
such a branching is more meaningful in terms of the WDP. The βm can be considered as
the price of the item m and the BoP algorithm is searching for the optimal price from the
set of {pimj }, subject to the discount and demand constraints. Violation of the discount and
the demand constraints leads βm to be a convex combination of some of the prices from the
set {pimj }. The proposed branching scheme partitions the set such that the same convex
combination cannot be encountered again, thereby removing the violation in the constraints.
In this way, one can expect that the algorithm will converge fast towards the optimal prices.
It is worth noting that even though the βm is a real number and thus the branching could
be infinitely divisible, the possible optimal values it can take is NM and hence the number
of branches is finite.
If there are more than one item which have fractional allocations, the algorithm has to
choose one item to branch. Let βm be the price of item m defined by the convex combination
(22) and Bm be the set of bids that partially supply item m. The item m′ to branch on is
chosen by one of the following rules:
BoP1 : m′ = argmin
m
{βm − βm : βm > βm, |Bm| > 1} (25)
BoP2 : m′ = argmin
m
{β
m
− βm : βm > βm, |Bm| > 1} (26)
BoP3 : m′ = arg max
m
{|Bm| : βm > βm, |Bm| > 1} (27)
BoP1 chooses the item with price closest to its lower bound, BoP2 chooses the item
with price closest to its upper bound, and BoP3 chooses the item with maximum number
of allocated bids. In all the three rules, the branching item is chosen such that its price
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Figure 4: With feasible IP solution
Bids Items
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Figure 5: With no feasible IP solution
is strictly greater than its lower bound. According to the rules of the creation of CPs,
branching on an item with βm = βm will create an infeasible CP- with range [βm, βm) and
CP+ with range [βm, β
m
), which is same as its parent CP. To avoid an infinite loop, only
items βm > βm are considered. However, a pathological case is encountered when all items
having their prices equal to their respective lower bounds. In this situation, we chose an
item m randomly and create only CP+ with range [βm + ǫ, β
m
). The ǫ > 0 is chosen such
that it is small enough to exclude just the price βm. Note that there is no CP- created and
with this new CP+ creation, it is possible that a feasible IP solution with prices {βm} might
be excluded in the search, thus not guaranteeing optimality.
No Strict Convex Price
Let there exist a non-integer solution such that βm = βm if |Bm| > 1. The cost of this
solution is
∑
m β
m and it is possible that there exists an integer solution with the same cost.
Consider the LP solution shown in Figure 4 as a transportation network. A link between
a bid and an item denotes the allocation. The (Supply) denotes the number of items that
the bid should supply. The option is to either accept the bid with a supply of three items
or reject the bid entirely. Note that modifying the supply will result in change of discount
and hence in the change of solution cost. The solution shown in the figure is infeasible as
each item is supplied by more than one bid. However, if allocation from any two bids are
removed then it is a feasible IP solution with the same cost as that of the LP solution. It
can be easily seen that the LP solution in Figure 5 has no feasible IP solution. Thus when
a LP solution is encountered with no item to branch on, it is required to find a feasible IP
solution with the same cost or prove that no such solution exists.
LetM be the set of items with |Bm| > 1 and βm = βm. Note that the rest of the items
will have |Bm| = 1 and hence satisfy the integrality constraints. Let Ij be the set of items
that are being supplied by bid j with allowed supply in the range [Sj , Sj ]. The allowed
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supply range is determined by the discounts at which the current partial allocation is made.
If Sj < Sj then θ
S
j
j = θ
Sj
j . Let J be the set of bids that supply items partially. Given such
a solution, one has to find a feasible IP solution with the following properties:
• |Bm| = 1, m ∈M
• |Ij | ∈ {0} ∪ [Sj , Sj], j ∈ J
The second property ensures that either the bid supplies in the allowable range such that
the cost of the solution is not altered or it is rejected. This is a capacitated facility location
problem, where the bids are the facilities that can be opened or closed and if opened their
capacity is in the allowable supply range.
Consider an item m′ ∈ M and let j′ ∈ Bm
′
be chosen to supply this item. This allocation
results in the following sequence of allocations:
1. Other bids in Bm
′
have to be removed: Bm
′
← Bm
′
\ {j}, j 6= j′ ∈ Bm
′
2. Item m′ is removed from corresponding Ij : Ij ← Ij \ {m′}
3. If removal of m′ from Ij violates the supply constraints, then it is removed:
|Ij | < Sj ⇒ B
m ← Bm \ {m}, m ∈ Ij
⇒ Ij ← ∅
The above sequence will result in one of the following cases:
1. A feasible IP solution.
2. A infeasible IP solution with any of |Bm| = 0.
3. At least there exists one m such that |Bm| > 1.
If a feasible solution is encountered then the search can be stopped. If an infeasible solution
is encountered, then m′ cannot be supplied by j′ and hence j′ can be removed. In this case,
the next bid from Bm
′
is considered for allocation. For case 3, a bid from Bm is chosen and
allocated to m and the search proceeds iteratively. If all bids of Bm
′
were allocated and no
feasible solution was found, then there exists no IP solution. This is a depth first search
that can be implemented using a recursive algorithm.
8.2 Primal Heuristics to Determine Incumbent Solutions
Let wimj be the optimal LP solution. If all are binary, then it is a feasible solution to the
IP. The following heuristic constructs a feasible solution from the fractional LP solution.
1. (Initialize) Sj = 0, ∀j
2. do ∀m: k = argj maxj,i{w
im
j }; Sk ← Sk + 1;
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3. Construct a transportation network with winning bids as sources and items as sinks.
The source corresponding to winning bid j has a supply of Sj > 0 and each sink has
a unit demand. The cost of flow from j to m is p
Sj ,m
j . Let x
m
j be the optimal flow.
Assign V
Sj
j = 1 and w
Sj ,m
j = x
m
j .
The winning bid for an item m is chosen as the one with the largest wimj value. This is used
to determine the number of winning items Sj for each winning bid. This is in turn used to
determine the winning items with the consistent discount prices p
Sj,m
j . This will provide
a better IP solution than directly rounding the largest wimj to 1. Using this heuristic, an
incumbent solution is obtained whenever a new CP is created and the best known solution
is updated and stored.
9 Computational Experiments
In this section, we present the results of the extensive computational experiments conducted
using the various proposed algorithms across various problem types.
9.1 Discount Auctions Test Suite
A test suite called as discount auctions test suite (DATS) was created to randomly generate
different types of problem instances. The intention is to study the effects of the varying
discount and cost structures on the computational requirements of the problem. A problem
instance is defined by M , N , {Qmj }, and {θ
i
j}. Given M and N , the cost and the discounts
can be generated in many ways. Firstly, there are two kinds of cost differences: relative
market costs across the items and for each item, relative bid costs quoted by the suppliers.
We assume a normalized market cost rcm for each item m, which is uniformly distributed
in range [rc, 1] with 0 < rc < 1. The rc is an input parameter and rcm are randomly chosen
in the above range. At least one item is chosen to have value 1 and another rc. The rc is
the minimum relative cost in the portfolio of items that are being procured. For example,
to model the scenario where the procured items have a maximum of 15% relative difference
in the cost, rc = 0.85.
For any given item, the bid price quoted by the suppliers vary. The minimum cost quoted
for an item m is captured using a parameter mcm. The mc is the input parameter and mcm
are randomly chosen in range [mc, 1). The individual cost of m for bid j in chosen in the
following way:
Qmj = Random[mc
m, 1] × rcm (28)
The above costs are chosen such that at least one bid has rcm and one has the minimum
cost mcm× rcm. As rcm denotes the market value, it is maximum price quoted that can be
quoted by the suppliers.
For generating the discount functions, a discount range is input to the DATS. For exam-
ple, if the input discount range is [θ, θ], then all the maximum discounts {θMj } are chosen
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randomly in this range. There is no discount for one item: θ1j = 0. The intermediate val-
ues are chosen according to type of the discount function. The DATS currently supports
following types of discount functions:
1. Linear: θij = (i− 1)×
θMj
M−1
2. Marginally Decreasing: θij = −
θMj
(M−1)2 × (M − i)
2 + θMj
3. Marginally Increasing: θij =
θMj
(M−1)2 × (i− 1)
2
4. Step
5. Arbitrary
6. Random: The discount type for a bid j is chosen randomly from one of the above.
All functions are strictly increasing, except for the type Step. The Arbitrary is strictly
increasing without any notable structure like the preceding types.
The experiments were carried out on a Windows XP based PC equipped with a 2.8GHz
Intel P4 processor with 1GB RAM. The algorithms were coded in Java, and for the model
building and solving of LP relaxations and transportation problems in primal heuristics,
ILOG Concert Technology of CPLEX 10.0 [15] was used.
9.2 LP Experiments
The first set of experiments were conducted to study the tightness of the LP relaxation with
cuts. The performance criterion is the duality gap, calculated as follows:
Duality Gap (%) =
Relaxed Value − Optimal Value
Optimal Value
× 100 (29)
The rationale for studying the duality gap is that it greatly influences the search time of
the branch-and-cut algorithms. The bounds given by the relaxation is used to prune the
search tree and hence tighter the bound, less the time taken to explore the tree. Extensive
experiments were conducted by varying the problem parameters shown in Table 1. The rc
and mc were varied from low to high values. The discounts [θ, θ] were chosen from three
different sets of values representing close range, medium range, and high range. M and N
were chosen to in two sets to study the effect of varying N for the same M and vice versa.
All the six discount types currently supported by DATS were tested.
Fifty problem instances were created for each of the different combination of values of
the parameters and the average duality gap for the LP relaxation with and without the cuts
were calculated. Following are the main inferences from the experimentation:
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Parameter Values
rc {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}
mc {0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.95}
[θ, θ] {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3], . . . , [0.8, 0.9]}
{[0.1, 0.5], [0.5, 0.9]}
{[0.1, 0.9]}
M , N {10}, {10, 25, 50, 75, 100}
{5, 10, 15, 20}, {30}
Discount types Linear, marginally decreasing, marginally increasing, step,
arbitrary, random
Table 1: Parameters and values for LP experimentation
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Figure 6: LP relaxation without cuts: N = 50, M = 15, rc = 0.5, [θ, θ] = [0.3, 0.4]
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Figure 7: LP relaxation with cuts: N = 50, M = 15, rc = 0.5, [θ, θ] = [0.3, 0.4]
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Figure 8: LP relaxation without cuts: N = 50, M = 15, rc = 0.5, [θ, θ] = [0.3, 0.4]
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Figure 9: LP relaxation without cuts: N = 50, M = 15, mc = 0.5, rc = 0.5, θ = θ − 0.1
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Duality
Gap
(%)
θ
Linear
s
s
s
s s s s s s
s
Marg. Inc.
× × × × × × × × ×
×
Arbitrary
⋆
⋆
⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆
Figure 10: LP relaxation with cuts: N = 50, M = 15, mc = 0.5, rc = 0.5, θ = θ − 0.1
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Figure 11: LP relaxation with cuts: N = 50, M = 15, mc = 0.5, rc = 0.5, θ = θ − 0.1
1. The LP relaxation with cuts gives significantly tighter bounds. Problem instances with
duality gap as high as 70% had a duality gap of less than 1% with cuts. Indeed for all
the problem instances considered, the average duality gap was less than 1% with the
addition of cuts.
2. The parameter rc had no effect on the duality gap. Thus items with varying costs or
similar costs have no influence on the duality gap.
3. The discount types did not affect the duality gap significantly for LP relaxation with-
out cuts. However, with the addition of cuts, the discount types had the maximum
average duality gap in the following increasing order: arbitrary (0.005%), marginally
increasing (0.03%), linear (0.04%), random (0.3%), step (0.6%), and marginally de-
creasing (0.9%). For most of the problem instances, linear, marginally increasing, and
arbitrary discount types had zero duality gap.
4. The parameter mc showed significant changes in the duality gap for both the LP
relaxations with and without cuts (see figures 6 to 8). As mentioned above, the duality
gap also depended on the discount types for relaxation with cuts.
5. Significant changes in the duality gap were observed for discounts chosen in close
range. As shown in figures 9 to 11, the duality gap increased with the increase of θ for
LP relaxation without cuts but showed a reverse behavior with cuts. Again, the gap
depended on the discount type for relaxation with cuts.
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6. For M = 10, the average duality gap increased steadily with the increase of N till 50
and became negligible for N = 75 and almost zero for N = 100. Similar results were
observed for varying M with fixed N . When the size of N becomes relatively larger
than that of M , the duality gap is negligible as with more N , the possibility of better
bids is high.
9.3 Branch-and-Cut Experiments
To study the performance of the branch-and-cut, a suite of algorithms were created by
combining different cut addition techniques and branching rules. Following cut addition
techniques were considered:
Cut-and-Branch (C&B) : All the NM2 cuts (wimj ≤ v
i
j , ∀j, i, m) are added to the IP
formulation at the root node.
Branch-and-Cut Global-w (B&C-Gbl-w) : After each simplex iteration (that solves
the LP relaxation), only those variables that violate the inequality wimj ≤ v
i
j induce
the corresponding cuts and are added globally to all the nodes in the search tree.
Branch-and-Cut Global-V (B&C-Gbl-V ) : After each simplex iteration, if an wimj vi-
olates the inequality wimj ≤ v
i
j then cuts for all items for that j and i are added as
global cuts.
Branch-and-Cut Local-w (B&C-Loc-w) : Same as B&C-Gbl-w, except that the cuts
are local cuts.
Branch-and-Cut Local-V (B&C-Loc-V ) : Same as B&C-Gbl-V , except that the cuts
are local cuts.
The different branching techniques include the traditional variable dichotomy (Var-Dic)
along with the three BoP techniques proposed in Section 8.1. With the above combinations
of cut addition and branching techniques, twenty branch-and-cut algorithms were used for
experimentation. The performance parameters considered were:
• CPU time (in milliseconds)
• number of nodes explored
• number of simplex iterations
Preliminary experimentation with BoS showed that the branch-and-cut was many folds
faster than BoS. This is not surprising given the tighter bounds obtained with the addition
of cuts. Hence, BoS was excluded from further experimentation and only the twenty branch-
and-cut algorithms were considered. The values for parameters mc, rc, [θ, θ] were chosen
based on the duality gap that was observed with LP relaxation. The entries in tables 2 to
6 are the triplet CPU time (ms), nodes explored, and simplex iterations. With more than
three hundred instances solved, following inferences were made:
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Table 2: Discount Type: Marginally Decreasing
N = 75, M = 15, mc = 0.4, rc = 0.3, [θ, θ] = [0.2, 0.3] , CPLEX Time = 38183
Var-Dic BoP1 BoP2 BoP3
C&B 69437, 12, 25 14262, 1, 3 21923, 2, 5 41865, 4, 9
B&C-Gbl-w 76225, 19, 593 19910, 1, 316 22985, 2, 351 36735, 4, 444
B&C-Gbl-V 149721, 28, 210 14844, 1, 107 18292, 2, 119 39076, 4, 148
B&C-Loc-w 428295, 21, 10308 34547, 1, 692 56266, 2, 1190 118037, 4, 2312
B&C-Loc-V 182156, 12, 2622 22655, 1, 269 41894, 2, 431 84364, 4, 860
Table 3: Discount Type: Marginally Decreasing
N = 75, M = 15, mc = 0.4, rc = 0.3, [θ, θ] = [0.2, 0.3] , CPLEX Time = 34174
Var-Dic BoP1 BoP2 BoP3
C&B 273008, 63, 127 122619, 13, 27 193618, 17, 35 128974, 15, 31
B&C-Gbl-w 187098, 66, 673 77276, 13, 431 119650, 18, 513 82121, 15, 489
B&C-Gbl-V 249583, 66, 281 118355, 13, 158 182611, 18, 178 132086, 15, 166
B&C-Loc-w 1673004, 79, 40747 302033, 13, 6153 396731, 18, 8226 404872, 15, 6641
B&C-Loc-V 1313137, 79, 16811 250748, 13, 2818 341685, 17, 3735 299482, 15, 2918
Table 4: Discount Type: Step
N = 50, M = 15, mc = 0.4, rc = 0.3, [θ, θ] = [0.2, 0.3] , CPLEX Time = 19904
Var-Dic BoP1 BoP2 BoP3
C&B 14171, 8, 178249, 1, 3 8281, 1, 3 7484, 1, 3
B&C-Gbl-w 11499, 4, 238 10499, 1, 220 10484, 1, 220 10874, 1, 251
B&C-Gbl-V 9577, 4, 98 9093, 1, 91 9062, 1, 91 7733, 1, 94
B&C-Loc-w 69401, 4, 1696 23545, 1, 539 23404, 1, 539 23795, 1, 550
B&C-Loc-V 133146, 10, 1784 18490, 1, 252 18396, 1, 252 19351, 1, 267
Table 5: Discount Type: Random
N = 50, M = 15, mc = 0.4, rc = 0.3, [θ, θ] = [0.2, 0.3] , CPLEX Time = 2735
Var-Dic BoP1 BoP2 BoP3
C&B 2048, 2, 5 1767, 1, 3 1766, 1, 3 1720, 1, 3
B&C-Gbl-w 3111, 3, 190 2830, 1, 177 2876, 1, 177 2783, 1, 176
B&C-Gbl-V 3126, 3, 81 2877, 1, 75 2892, 1, 75 2861, 1, 75
B&C-Loc-w 19026, 3, 1176 8082, 1, 460 8286, 1, 460 7754, 1, 458
B&C-Loc-V 18072, 3, 501 7832, 1, 206 7879, 1, 206 7520, 1, 202
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Table 6: Discount Type: Random
N = 75, M = 15, mc = 0.4, rc = 0.3, [θ, θ] = [0.2, 0.3] , CPLEX Time = 8125
Var-Dic BoP1 BoP2 BoP3
C&B 4422, 5, 11 17281, 7, 15 22563, 7, 15 3516, 1, 3
B&C-Gbl-w 4875, 5, 160 20093, 7, 296 15562, 7, 257 4672, 1, 152
B&C-Gbl-V 4547, 5, 96 18953, 7, 145 15125, 7, 121 4219, 1, 88
B&C-Loc-w 43234, 5, 1570 66891, 7, 2056 57422, 7, 2046 12937, 1, 424
B&C-Loc-V 41109, 5, 847 59500, 7, 1249 58281, 7, 1316 11391, 1, 228
• Problem instances with linear, marginally increasing, and arbitrary discount types
required no branching and were solved at the root node itself. Even for problem
instances with non-zero duality gap, the primal heuristic proposed in Section 8.2 found
the optimal solution at the root node.
• For the rest of the discount types, the nodes explored and time taken were purely
instance specific and was not much influenced by the parameter values. Tables 2 and
3 show the widely varying performance of two problem instances with the same set of
parameter values.
• Every problem instance was solved using the commercial solver CPLEX using the IP
formulation with cuts. CPLEX uses branch-and-cut with built pre-processing, cut
generation routines, advanced branching techniques, and primal heuristics [16]. For
most of the problem instances, the minimum time taken by the proposed branch-and-
cut algorithms (shown in bold face in the tables) was less than that of CPLEX.
• The no strict convex price case was encountered only for the problems with step dis-
count function.
• Performance of algorithms with local cuts was relatively poor for all the instances.
• In almost all the cases, BoP branching techniques (in particular BoP1 and BoP3)
showed better performance than variable dichotomy.
• Cut-and-branch is computationally better than the other cut addition techniques,
though in few cases global cuts showed superior performance.
10 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we proposed a new auction mechanism called as discount auctions for procuring
single units of multiple items. This is useful in industrial procurement scenarios, where an
organization is interested in buying M distinct, possibly related, items from a pool of N
suppliers. The M items are assumed to be independent and compatible with each other
even if brought from different suppliers. For this scenario, traditional combinatorial bids for
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subsets of items are redundant, and the proposed discount bids are more meaningful. Further
the bids to be communicated are linear in the number of items, in contrast to exponential
number of combinatorial bids. However, despite its simplicity, the winner determination
problem was proved to be NP-hard upon reduction from the set covering problem.
We proposed two intelligent optimal search algorithms. The first algorithm, called as
BoS (branch-on-supply) is a branch-and-bound algorithm, which uses the embedded net-
work structure in the problem to determine the optimal number of items supplied by each
seller. The algorithm preserves the combinatorial structure of the problem and uses special
branching technique to search for the optimal solution. The second is a suite of branch-and-
cut algorithms that use valid inequalities added as cuts to the IP formulation. The valid
inequalities that are added as cuts are not facet-defining. However, the size of the entire
family of the cuts is polynomial (NM2) and can be determined directly from the LP solu-
tion. Computational experiments showed that the duality gap is considerably less and hence
the algorithm is many-folds faster than that of BoS. A novel branching technique called as
BoP (branch-on-price) was proposed. It branches on the price of an item that is infeasible
allocated to more than one supplier. Extensive computational experiments were performed
using the problems generated by a test suite.
This work was devoted mainly to the computational aspects of solving the winner deter-
mination problem to optimality. There are several interesting research fronts in which the
discount auctions could be explored further.
• Iterative Discount Auctions: We considered here an one-shot discount auctions with
just a single round of bidding. Iterative auctions with several rounds of bidding are
preferable for auctions with large number of items. The suppliers need not commu-
nicate the entire discount bid, but can progressively express the bids based on the
dynamics of the auction. The commonly used approach is the mechanism design tech-
nique with duality theory of mathematical programming.
• Eliciting Bidder Preferences: One of the important problems in auctions is the bid
preparation. For discount auctions, the bidder has to specify individual costs for M
items and a discount function. Determining the discount for the number of items
may not be easy and one need a preference elicitation mechanism to determine the
discounts.
• Multiunit Discount Auctions: In this paper, we considered single unit of multiple units.
An useful extension is to look at multiple units of multiple items. Inclusion of multiple
items adds another layer of complexity and the proposed algorithms in this work are
not directly extendable.
• Discounts based on Cost: The discount structure considered in this paper depends on
the number of items bought. Another meaningful perspective is to define the discounts
based on the total cost of the items procured.
• 0-1 Knapsack with GUB Constraints: We added a family of valid inequalities from the
LP relaxation. The formulation also has a 0-1 knapsack structure (31) with GUB (gen-
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eralized upper bound) constraints (31). In particular, the following set of constraints
constitute a multiple choice knapsack structure.
∑
i
vij ≤ 1 ∀j (30)
∑
j
∑
i
ivij = M (31)
Generation of valid cover inequalities for 0-1 knapsacks with generalized upper bound
constraints were studied in [30]. The generation of cuts would involve solving the hard
separation problem, either optimally or approximately. It is worth investigating the
hardness of the separation problem for the above constraints and studying the trade-
offs of investing resources in generation of the cover inequalities against the savings in
the convergence of the algorithm.
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